They are available in full-scale pressure/ vacuum ranges from 0.1 to 1000 Torr (and metric equivalents) and are suited for many industrial, electronic, and research applications. Its large LCD display provides a high-resolution digital display of the pressure or vacuum, and it can accommodate Baratron capacitance manometers with a total current draw of up to 2.0 amps at ±15VDC input power. Stuxnet, of course, was the first known example of a cyber-physical attack. They won’t be able to take down a power grid or blow up chemical facilities,» says Ralph Langer, founder of Langner Communications and a top Stuxnet expert.
That doesn’t mean an attacker needs to actually have engineering expertise, however. The first phase of the actual attack could be compromising a workstation to mimic HMI traffic, for example, he says. The danger is when attackers have an understanding of the physical and engineering aspects of the plant or site they are targeting, he says. «We have not seen a lot of cyber-physical attacks in the past to actually cause much damage.
That requires skillsets that have nothing to do with hacking,» says Langner. Namely, malicious attackers are more likely to make the process control systems «misbehave» while remaining operational — much like Stuxnet aimed to do. Inflicting major or physical harm in ICS/SCADA environments takes more than malware. S4x15 Conference — The real threat to a power or manufacturing plant isn’t the latest vulnerability or malware variant. «If you only consider hackers, you don’t have to be concerned that much.